hobokenchicken
e10cb22811
fix(webrtc): update CSP to allow background processor wasm and blob execution
2026-07-06 13:14:27 +00:00
hobokenchicken
074742ddb4
feat(webrtc): render remote audio tracks and allow camera access
2026-07-06 12:25:40 +00:00
hobokenchicken
f9b1e16e3a
fix(webrtc): configure external TURN server and update CSP to allow inline scripts
2026-07-06 12:20:53 +00:00
hobokenchicken
d3b7f39b9e
fix(build): make build-web works; gofmt all Go files
2026-06-30 10:01:11 -04:00
hobokenchicken
a8a09cf7b4
fix: CSRF and WS origin check trust request Host header (same-origin)
2026-06-29 14:38:18 -04:00
hobokenchicken
5c7e461dad
fix: CSRF middleware now trusts origin hostname match instead of exact prefix
...
The old CSRF middleware used exact string matching against a static list
of origins (https://host , http://localhost:port ). This broke when the
frontend ran on a different port (Vite dev server) or accessed via LAN IP.
New behavior:
- Origin hostname matching: any Origin whose hostname matches cfg.Host
is trusted, regardless of scheme or port
- Localhost variants always trusted: localhost, 127.0.0.1, ::1
- Additional origins can be passed explicitly (future env var support)
2026-06-29 12:57:52 -04:00
hobokenchicken
130187c7be
security: remediate all P0-P2 audit findings (12 tasks)
...
P0 fixes:
- WebSocket origin checking (reject untrusted origins)
- WS session token moved from URL query param to first message frame
- WebAuthn login cookie now uses Secure flag via shared SetSessionCookie
- PostgreSQL sslmode configurable via POSTGRES_SSLMODE env (default: require)
- Fixed DatabaseDSN to use real password instead of masked placeholder
P1 fixes:
- Per-IP rate limiting middleware (auth: 5 req/s, invites: 2 req/s)
- Security headers on all responses (CSP, X-Frame-Options, nosniff, etc.)
- WS broadcasts scoped to server members (prevents cross-server data leak)
- Webhook tokens stored as SHA-256 hashes (not plaintext)
P2 fixes:
- CSRF protection via Origin header validation on state-changing requests
- MANAGE_CHANNELS permission enforced on channel update/delete
- Upload validation: 25MB limit, extension allowlist, server-side MIME check
- File serve: path traversal protection + Content-Disposition: attachment
Files: 23 changed, +499/-100. Builds clean (go build, go vet, npm build).
Zero CVEs (govulncheck, npm audit).
2026-06-29 09:30:50 -04:00
hobokenchicken
af1de3d140
Phase 6: Permissions, Push, WebAuthn scaffolding
...
Backend:
- internal/permissions/permissions.go: permission bitflags (VIEW_CHANNEL through SHARE_SCREEN)
- internal/permissions/checker.go: permission checker with role aggregation
- internal/middleware/permission.go: RequirePermission middleware
- internal/push/handlers.go: push subscription CRUD, VAPID key endpoint, SendPush
- internal/auth/webauthn.go: WebAuthn passkey scaffolding (begin/finish endpoints)
- internal/db/db.go: is_default on roles, push_subscriptions table, webauthn_credentials table
- go.mod: added webpush-go, go-webauthn dependencies
Frontend:
- stores/role.ts: Zustand store for role management
- RoleManager.tsx: role CRUD with permission checkboxes
- MemberRoleAssign.tsx: assign roles to members
- App.tsx: /servers/:serverId/roles route
2026-06-28 17:53:44 -04:00
hobokenchicken
e499ce884d
Initial scaffold: Go backend, React frontend, Docker Compose
...
- Go backend: config, db (PostgreSQL migrations), auth (argon2id + sessions),
middleware (cookie sessions, RequireAuth), chi router, cmd/server
- React frontend: Vite + React 18 + TS + Tailwind + Gruvbox palette + terminal CSS
- Docker: compose.yml (Postgres, Valkey, minio, LiveKit, coturn, Caddy),
livekit.yaml, Caddyfile, Dockerfile (multi-stage Go+Node+Alpine)
- .env.example, .gitignore, README.md
2026-06-26 14:41:10 -04:00
hobokenchicken