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fix: resolve 7 audit issues - webhook tokens, cookie security, avatar save, TUI fallback, dead code, valkey default

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This commit is contained in:
Dustin Newkirk
2026-06-30 13:29:34 -04:00
parent 6f43e4f3a0
commit 2caedc172b
9 changed files with 41 additions and 103 deletions
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ISSUES.md
+17 -24
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@@ -6,11 +6,9 @@ This document contains a comprehensive audit of the dumpsterChat repository, hig
## 1. Security Vulnerabilities & Bypasses
### 🚨 Plaintext Webhook Tokens Stored in Database (Task 8 Regression/Incomplete)
### 🚨 Plaintext Webhook Tokens Stored in Database (Task 8 Regression/Incomplete) ✅ RESOLVED
* **Location:** [internal/db/db.go](file:///opt/dumpsterChat/internal/db/db.go#L171-L191), [internal/webhook/handlers.go](file:///opt/dumpsterChat/internal/webhook/handlers.go#L145-L151)
* **Description:** While a `token_hash` column and SHA-256 validation were added to execute webhooks securely, the database migrations did not drop the plaintext `token` column. Furthermore, when webhooks are created, the handler still inserts the plaintext token directly into the `token` column alongside `token_hash`.
* **Impact:** If the database is compromised, an attacker can retrieve all webhook tokens in plaintext, bypassing the security gains of hashing.
* **Remediation:** Drop the `token` column from the database schema and modify the `INSERT` query in `Create` webhook handler to only store `token_hash`.
* **Fix:** DROP COLUMN migration added, INSERT no longer stores plaintext `token`.
### 🚨 Message and Channel Access Bypasses Role Permissions & Overrides
* **Location:** [internal/message/handlers.go](file:///opt/dumpsterChat/internal/message/handlers.go#L671-L692), [internal/channel/handlers.go](file:///opt/dumpsterChat/internal/channel/handlers.go#L165-L187)
@@ -18,45 +16,41 @@ This document contains a comprehensive audit of the dumpsterChat repository, hig
* **Impact:** Any user who is a member of a server can read, search, and post messages in *any* channel on that server (including private, forum, calendar, or documentation channels), completely bypassing the permissions configuration system.
* **Remediation:** Update `requireChannelAccess` in `message.Handler` to use `permissions.Checker` to verify channel permission overrides and server roles.
### ⚠️ WebAuthn Session Cookie SameSite Laxity
### ⚠️ WebAuthn Session Cookie SameSite Laxity ✅ RESOLVED
* **Location:** [internal/auth/cookie.go](file:///opt/dumpsterChat/internal/auth/cookie.go#L20)
* **Description:** The session cookie's `SameSite` attribute is set to `http.SameSiteDefaultMode` (which modern browsers default to `SameSite=Lax`). For session tokens, `StrictMode` or explicit `LaxMode` is highly recommended to protect against CSRF.
* **Remediation:** Change `SameSite` to `http.SameSiteStrictMode` or `http.SameSiteLaxMode` explicitly.
* **Fix:** Changed to `http.SameSiteStrictMode`.
### ⚠️ WebAuthn Session Cookie Secure Flag Relies on Env Var
### ⚠️ WebAuthn Session Cookie Secure Flag Relies on Env Var ✅ RESOLVED
* **Location:** [internal/auth/cookie.go](file:///opt/dumpsterChat/internal/auth/cookie.go#L12-L19)
* **Description:** The `Secure` flag on the session cookie is determined by `os.Getenv("COOKIE_SECURE") == "true"`. If this environment variable is misconfigured or omitted in production, the session cookie will be sent over unencrypted HTTP connections.
* **Remediation:** Default `secure` to `true` or check if the incoming request is served over HTTPS to automatically enable/disable it.
* **Fix:** Default `secure` to `true` unless `COOKIE_SECURE=false` explicitly set.
---
## 2. Functional Bugs & Defects
### 🐛 User Avatar Cannot Be Changed
* **Location:** [internal/auth/handlers.go](file:///opt/dumpsterChat/internal/auth/handlers.go#L212-L225), [internal/upload/handlers.go](file:///opt/dumpsterChat/internal/upload/handlers.go#L121-L123), [web/src/components/UserSettings.tsx](file:///opt/dumpsterChat/web/src/components/UserSettings.tsx#L73-L84)
* **Description:** The file upload endpoint `/api/v1/upload` uploads a file and returns its URL, but does not associate it with the user. The `UpdateProfile` handler (`PATCH /auth/me`) does not accept an avatar field in its payload, meaning there is no way to update the user's avatar database column. The frontend settings page allows uploading a new avatar, but since it is never saved to the profile, it reverts to the Gravatar on the next load.
* **Remediation:** Add `AvatarURL` to the `updateProfileRequest` payload and update the database query in `UpdateProfile` to set the `avatar` column.
### 🐛 User Avatar Cannot Be Changed ✅ RESOLVED
* **Location:** [internal/auth/handlers.go](file:///opt/dumpsterChat/internal/auth/handlers.go#L212-L225)
* **Fix:** Added `AvatarURL` to `updateProfileRequest`, wired into SQL UPDATE for `avatar` column.
### 🐛 TUI Client Auth Failure Fallback Bug
### 🐛 TUI Client Auth Failure Fallback Bug ✅ RESOLVED
* **Location:** [cmd/tui/auth.go](file:///opt/dumpsterChat/cmd/tui/auth.go#L28)
* **Description:** If `term.ReadPassword` fails during TUI login, the fallback code runs `fmt.Scanln(&email)` instead of reading the password, which overwrites the user's email with whatever password they type.
* **Remediation:** Change `fmt.Scanln(&email)` to read into a password variable (e.g. `var password string; fmt.Scanln(&password)`).
* **Fix:** Fallback reads into password variable instead of overwriting email.
---
## 3. Dead Code
### 🗑️ Unused `ComputeChannelPermissions`
### 🗑️ Unused `ComputeChannelPermissions` ✅ RESOLVED
* **Location:** [internal/permissions/overrides.go](file:///opt/dumpsterChat/internal/permissions/overrides.go#L10)
* **Description:** The helper method `ComputeChannelPermissions` (which properly layers channel-level overrides on top of server-wide role permissions) is never called anywhere in the active codebase.
* **Fix:** Removed the unused function.
### 🗑️ Duplicated Permission Verification
* **Location:** [internal/message/handlers.go](file:///opt/dumpsterChat/internal/message/handlers.go#L136-L164)
* **Description:** The `checkPermission` method in `message.Handler` duplicates role checking queries instead of using the `permissions.Checker` struct.
### 🗑️ Obsolete Handler Type
### 🗑️ Obsolete Handler Type ✅ RESOLVED
* **Location:** [internal/message/handlers.go](file:///opt/dumpsterChat/internal/message/handlers.go#L31-L35)
* **Description:** `Handler_old` is declared but never instantiated or used.
* **Fix:** Removed `Handler_old`.
---
@@ -66,7 +60,6 @@ This document contains a comprehensive audit of the dumpsterChat repository, hig
* **Description:** There are zero unit or integration tests in the Go backend or React frontend (`go test ./...` runs but finds no test files).
* **Remediation:** Introduce tests for critical components such as permissions checking, message parsing, and session stores.
### 🔑 Hardcoded Valkey Password Placeholder
### 🔑 Hardcoded Valkey Password Placeholder ✅ RESOLVED
* **Location:** [internal/config/config.go](file:///opt/dumpsterChat/internal/config/config.go#L111)
* **Description:** The default fallback `VALKEY_URL` contains a masked password placeholder (`redis://localhost:***@example.com`), which is invalid.
* **Remediation:** Default fallback to a simple local endpoint without authentication (e.g., `redis://localhost:6379`).
* **Fix:** Default fallback set to `redis://localhost:6379`.
cmd/tui/auth.go
+12 -5
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@@ -21,16 +21,23 @@ func RunAuth(api *APIClient) (string, error) {
email, _ := reader.ReadString('\n')
email = strings.TrimSpace(email)
var password string
fmt.Print(" Password: ")
pwBytes, err := term.ReadPassword(int(syscall.Stdin))
if err != nil {
// Fallback to plain read
fmt.Scanln(&email)
return "", fmt.Errorf("read password: %w", err)
var pwLine string
fmt.Scanln(&pwLine)
password = strings.TrimSpace(pwLine)
fmt.Println()
if password == "" {
return "", fmt.Errorf("read password: %w", err)
}
} else {
fmt.Println() // newline after password
password = strings.TrimSpace(string(pwBytes))
}
fmt.Println() // newline after password
password := strings.TrimSpace(string(pwBytes))
if email == "" || password == "" {
return "", fmt.Errorf("email and password are required")
internal/auth/cookie.go
+2 -2
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@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ import (
// SetSessionCookie writes the session cookie with secure defaults.
// Shared by password login, registration, and WebAuthn login.
func SetSessionCookie(w http.ResponseWriter, cookieName, token string, duration time.Duration) {
secure := os.Getenv("COOKIE_SECURE") == "true"
secure := os.Getenv("COOKIE_SECURE") != "false"
http.SetCookie(w, &http.Cookie{
Name: cookieName,
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ func SetSessionCookie(w http.ResponseWriter, cookieName, token string, duration
Path: "/",
HttpOnly: true,
Secure: secure,
SameSite: http.SameSiteDefaultMode,
SameSite: http.SameSiteStrictMode,
MaxAge: int(duration.Seconds()),
})
}
internal/auth/handlers.go
+3 -2
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@@ -210,6 +210,7 @@ type loginRequest struct {
}
type updateProfileRequest struct {
AvatarURL string `json:"avatar_url"`
DisplayName string `json:"display_name"`
Bio string `json:"bio"`
AccentColor string `json:"accent_color"`
@@ -482,9 +483,9 @@ func (h *Handler) UpdateProfile(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
_, err := h.db.ExecContext(r.Context(), `
UPDATE users
SET display_name = $2, bio = $3, accent_color = $4, status_text = $5, status = COALESCE(NULLIF($6, ''), status),
banner_url = NULLIF($7, ''), tagline = NULLIF($8, ''), pronouns = NULLIF($9, ''), social_links = $10
banner_url = NULLIF($7, ''), tagline = NULLIF($8, ''), pronouns = NULLIF($9, ''), social_links = $10, avatar = COALESCE(NULLIF($11, ''), avatar)
WHERE id = $1
`, userID, req.DisplayName, req.Bio, req.AccentColor, req.StatusText, req.Status, req.BannerURL, req.Tagline, req.Pronouns, socialLinksJSON)
`, userID, req.DisplayName, req.Bio, req.AccentColor, req.StatusText, req.Status, req.BannerURL, req.Tagline, req.Pronouns, socialLinksJSON, req.AvatarURL)
if err != nil {
http.Error(w, `{"error":"update failed"}`, http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
internal/config/config.go
+1 -1
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@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ func Load() *Config {
SSLMode: getEnv("POSTGRES_SSLMODE", "require"),
},
Valkey: ValkeyConfig{
URL: getEnv("VALKEY_URL", "redis://localhost:***@example.com"),
URL: getEnv("VALKEY_URL", "redis://localhost:6379"),
},
MinIO: MinIOConfig{
Endpoint: getEnv("MINIO_ENDPOINT", ""),
internal/db/db.go
+3
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@@ -189,6 +189,9 @@ CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_webhooks_token ON webhooks(token);
ALTER TABLE webhooks ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS token_hash VARCHAR(64);
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_webhooks_token_hash ON webhooks(token_hash);
-- Drop plaintext token column — token_hash is the only stored credential
ALTER TABLE webhooks DROP COLUMN IF EXISTS token;
-- Ensure reply_to column exists on messages (added after initial table creation)
ALTER TABLE messages ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS reply_to UUID REFERENCES messages(id) ON DELETE SET NULL;
internal/message/handlers.go
-6
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@@ -28,12 +28,6 @@ type Handler struct {
logger *slog.Logger
}
type Handler_old struct {
db *sql.DB
hub *gateway.Hub
mentions *MentionHandler
}
func NewHandler(db *sql.DB, hub *gateway.Hub, pushHandler *push.Handler, logger *slog.Logger) *Handler {
return &Handler{
db: db,
internal/permissions/overrides.go
-60
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@@ -5,66 +5,6 @@ import (
"database/sql"
)
// ComputeChannelPermissions returns effective permissions for a user in a specific channel,
// layering channel overrides on top of server-wide role permissions.
func (c *Checker) ComputeChannelPermissions(ctx context.Context, serverID, channelID, userID string) (int64, error) {
base, err := c.GetUserPermissions(ctx, serverID, userID)
if err != nil {
return 0, err
}
if Has(base, ADMINISTRATOR) {
return base, nil
}
// Everyone role override applies first.
var everyoneID string
_ = c.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, `SELECT id FROM roles WHERE server_id = $1 AND is_default = TRUE LIMIT 1`, serverID).Scan(&everyoneID)
if everyoneID != "" {
allow, deny, err := c.getOverride(ctx, channelID, "role", everyoneID)
if err != nil {
return 0, err
}
base |= allow
base &^= deny
}
// Member-specific role overrides.
rows, err := c.db.QueryContext(ctx, `
SELECT r.id FROM roles r
INNER JOIN member_roles mr ON mr.role_id = r.id
WHERE mr.user_id = $1 AND mr.server_id = $2
`, userID, serverID)
if err != nil {
return 0, err
}
defer rows.Close()
for rows.Next() {
var roleID string
if err := rows.Scan(&roleID); err != nil {
return 0, err
}
allow, deny, err := c.getOverride(ctx, channelID, "role", roleID)
if err != nil {
return 0, err
}
base |= allow
base &^= deny
}
if err := rows.Err(); err != nil {
return 0, err
}
// User-specific override wins last.
allow, deny, err := c.getOverride(ctx, channelID, "user", userID)
if err != nil {
return 0, err
}
base |= allow
base &^= deny
return base, nil
}
func (c *Checker) getOverride(ctx context.Context, channelID, targetType, targetID string) (allow, deny int64, err error) {
err = c.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, `
SELECT allow_bitflags, deny_bitflags FROM channel_overrides
internal/webhook/handlers.go
+3 -3
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@@ -143,10 +143,10 @@ func (h *Handler) Create(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
var avatar sql.NullString
var createdAt sql.NullString
err = h.db.QueryRowContext(r.Context(), `
INSERT INTO webhooks (channel_id, name, token, token_hash, avatar, created_by)
VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5, $6)
INSERT INTO webhooks (channel_id, name, token_hash, avatar, created_by)
VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5)
RETURNING id, channel_id, name, avatar, created_by, created_at::text
`, channelID, req.Name, token, tokenHash, req.Avatar, userID).Scan(
`, channelID, req.Name, tokenHash, req.Avatar, userID).Scan(
&wh.ID, &wh.ChannelID, &wh.Name, &avatar, &wh.CreatedBy, &createdAt,
)
if err != nil {